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There is a growing realisation that human error contributes 
significantly to morbidity and mortality in modern healthcare. 
With the ever-increasing reliance on complex technology and the 
multidisciplinary team approach to modern healthcare, many 
opportunities exist for human error to impact on clinical outcome. [1-3] 
In response, there has been a renewed focus on the study of 
human error and its potential effect in healthcare settings.[4-6] This 
interest was stimulated by the publication of the monograph To 
Err is Human[1] in 2000. Since then, a number of taxonomies and 
classification systems have been developed in an attempt to categorise 
errors and quantify their impact.[2,3] These taxonomies have been 
based on work by industrial psychologists such as James Reason, who 
began to study human error in diverse industries such as aviation, 
nuclear power and rail transportation.[2] All these industries have 
managed to develop enviable safety records over the past half century 
as they applied the lessons of error theory. However, the same cannot 
be said for healthcare. Despite the call made in To Err is Human, it 
would appear that applying error prevention strategies to healthcare 
is more difficult than applying it to large organisations. This does not 
imply that the attempt should be abandoned, but rather that ongoing 
research is required to better define the spectrum and impact of error 
in health systems.[1-7] This problem is especially relevant in developing 
countries such as South Africa (SA), where resources are much more 
limited than in developed countries yet the impact of error on patient 
outcome is just as important. However, there is currently very limited 
literature that focuses on the developing world setting.
Objectives
The present study was a direct response to this unmet need and 
focused on a single component of a complex therapeutic pathway, 
namely advanced imaging in the acute care of the polytrauma 
patient. It sought to record and identify adverse events and errors 
as they impacted on acute trauma patients undergoing a computed 
tomography (CT) scan and then to quantify the effect this had on 
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Background. There is growing realisation that human error contributes significantly to morbidity and mortality in modern healthcare. 
A number of taxonomies and classification systems have been developed in an attempt to categorise errors and quantify their impact.
Objectives. To record and identify adverse events and errors as they impacted on acute trauma patients undergoing a computed tomography 
(CT) scan, and then quantify the effect this had on the individual patients. It is hoped that these data will provide evidence to develop error 
prevention programmes designed to reduce the incidence of human error.
Methods. The trauma database was interrogated for the period December 2012 - April 2017. All patients aged >18 years who underwent a 
CT scan for blunt trauma were included. All recorded morbidity for these patients was reviewed.
Results. During the period under review, a total of 1 566 patients required a CT scan at our institution following blunt trauma. Of these, 192 
(12.3%, 134 male and 58 female) experienced an error related to the process of undergoing a CT scan. Of 755 patients who underwent a CT 
scan with intravenous contrast, detailed results were available for 312, and of these 46 (14.7%) had an acute deterioration in renal function. 
According to Chang’s taxonomy, physical harm occurred as follows: grade I n=6, grade II n=62, grade III n=45, grade IV n=11, grade V n=27, 
grade VI n=21, grade VII n=15, grade VIII n=3 and grade IX n=2. Adverse events were performing an unnecessary scan (n=24), omitting 
an indicated scan (n=23), performing the scan incorrectly (n=8), scanning the wrong body part (n=7), equipment failure (n=18), omitting 
treatment following the scan (n=6), incorrect interpretation of the scan (n=65), deterioration during the scan (n=6) and others (n=35). The 
setting for the error was the ward (n=19), the radiology suite (n=126), the emergency department (n=45) and the operating theatre (n=2). The 
staff responsible for the adverse events were medical (n=155), nursing (n=4) and radiology staff (n=15). There were 67 errors of commission 
and 125 errors of omission. The primary cause was a planning problem in 78 cases and an execution problem in 114.
Conclusions. Errors and adverse events related to obtaining a CT scan following blunt polytrauma are not uncommon and may impact 
significantly on the patient. Communication is essential to eliminate errors related to performing the wrong type of scan. The commonest 
errors relate to misinterpretation of the scan.
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the individual patients. It is hoped that this knowledge will provide 
evidence to develop error prevention programmes designed to reduce 
the incidence of human error and limit its impact on individual 
patients.
Methods
Clinical setting
The city of Pietermaritzburg is the capital of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) 
Province, SA, and the largest city in the western half of KZN, with 
one million inhabitants. The city is the referral point for western 
KZN, which is a predominantly rural area with a population of two 
million people. The Pietermaritzburg Metropolitan Trauma Service 
provides and supervises trauma care across the city and maintains 
a prospective digital trauma registry for the region. Ethics approval 
to maintain the registry was obtained from the Biomedical Research 
Ethics Committee  of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (ref. no. 
BCA221/13). This digital registry, called the Hybrid Electronic 
Medical Registry, is unique and has been discussed in the literature. [7] 
The clerking medical staff enter the data onto an electronic pre-
prepared clerking sheet. This is the process for all new admissions, 
meaning that clinical data are entered in real time. As the data 
are entered, they are directly incorporated into the registry. The 
completed pre-prepared clerking sheet is then printed and becomes 
the patient’s clinical record. A similar process is followed at operation 
and at discharge. This system combines the functions of a medical 
registry and a medical record system. It also combines an electronic 
system with a paper-based system.[7]
Management algorithms
All blunt trauma patients are managed according to standard 
protocols. Patients who do not respond undergo a FAST (focused 
assessment with sonography for trauma) scan and are then expedited 
to the operating theatre if there is free intra-abdominal fluid. All other 
patients are then selected for a CT scan based on the mechanism of 
injury and clinical findings.
Taxonomy of error
Chang’s taxonomy was used in this study. This taxonomy was 
used by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations to produce a standardised nomenclature for 
the taxonomy of adverse outcomes. It classifies error into five 
complementary root nodes, which equate to the general descriptive 
terms in parentheses below.[3] 
• Impact (How bad was it?). The taxonomy attempts to grade 
the impact of each adverse event on the individual patient and 
consists of three subclassifications that discriminate between 
18 types of outcomes or effects. The harm index characterises the 
degree of harm experienced, and this can range from no harm to 
temporary or permanent impairment of physical or psychological 
function. The taxonomy also distinguishes between the medical 
(psychological or physical) and non-medical (legal, social or 
economic) impact of the adverse event.
• Type (What went wrong?). This refers to the processes of care 
that failed. We divide the processes of care into broad categories, 
namely errors of resuscitation, errors of assessment, operative or 
technical error, and logistical failure. A patient may experience any 
number of combinations of failed processes.
• Domain (Where did it go wrong?). The physical location where 
the event took place.
• Cause (Why did it go wrong?). The causes are divided into 
errors of planning, errors of execution, errors of omission (failure 
to undertake a necessary action) and errors of commission 
(the performance of an inappropriate action). Resuscitation and 
logistical failures are errors of execution, while assessment failures 
are errors of planning.
• Prevention (What are we going to do about it?). All error reduc-
tion programmes need to develop interventions to reduce the 
incidence of error and to limit its effect.
Grading of morbidity
The Clavien-Dindo grading system[8] for all surgical complications 
was introduced in 2004. It is reproduced in Table 1. This grading 
system has been widely adopted and is a useful way of characterising 
the impact of an adverse event on an individual patient.
Interrogation of the trauma database
The trauma database was interrogated for the period December 
2012 - April 2017. All patients aged >18 years who underwent a CT 
scan for blunt trauma were included. All recorded morbidity for these 
patients was reviewed. Morbidities not related to the actual process 
of obtaining a CT scan were excluded, following a modified Delphi 
technique. Once consensus had been achieved on which morbidities 
were directly associated with the process of obtaining a CT scan, this 
cohort became the study group.
Statistical analysis
Means and standard deviations are reported for normally distributed 
data, and medians and interquartile ranges for data not normally 
distributed. All data analyses were performed using SPSS 24.0 for 
Mac (SPSS, USA).
Table 1. The Clavien-Dindo grading system[8]
Grade I Any deviation from the normal postoperative course not requiring surgical, endoscopic or radiological intervention.  
This includes the need for certain drugs (e.g. antiemetics, antipyretics, analgesics, diuretics and electrolytes), treatment with 
physiotherapy, and wound infections that are opened at the bedside
Grade II Complications requiring drug treatments other than those allowed for grade I complications; these include blood transfusion 
and total parenteral nutrition
Grade III Complications requiring surgical, endoscopic or radiological intervention
• Grade IIIa: intervention not under general anaesthetic
• Grade IIIb: intervention under general anaesthetic
Grade IV Life-threatening complications, including central nervous system complications (e.g. brain haemorrhage, ischaemic stroke, 
subarachnoid haemorrhage) that require intensive care, but excluding transient ischaemic attacks
• Grade IVa: single-organ dysfunction (including dialysis)
• Grade IVb: multi-organ dysfunction
Grade V Death 
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Results
During the period under review, 1 566 patients required a CT 
scan at our institution following blunt trauma. Of 755 patients 
who underwent a CT scan with intravenous contrast, 192 (12.3%) 
experienced an error or adverse event related to the process of 
undergoing a CT scan; 134 of these patients were male and 58 female. 
The racial breakdown was black African n=165, Asian n=11, white 
n=10 and coloured n=6. Table  2 summarises the demographic 
characteristics.
Impact
There were legal implications in 31 cases, social implications in 
136 and economic implications in 137. Morbidity is documented 
and classified against Chang’s impact score and the Clavien-Dindo 
grading system in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Two patients in this 
cohort ultimately died. One was sent to CT scanning inappropriately 
instead of being expedited to the operating theatre, and the other, 
who had a massive head injury, died shortly after returning from 
the CT scan. Of the 755 patients who underwent a CT scan with 
intravenous contrast, detailed results were available for 312, and 
of these 46 (14.7%) experienced an acute deterioration in renal 
function.
Type
The adverse events included performing an unnecessary scan (n=24), 
omitting an indicated scan (n=23), performing the scan incorrectly 
(n=8), scanning the wrong body part (n=7), equipment failure (n=18), 
omitting treatment following the scan (n=6), incorrect interpretation 
of the scan (n=65), deterioration during or shortly after the scan 
(n=18 cases, of which 6 occurred during the CT scan and required 
an intervention), and miscellaneous (n=35). In 21 cases a significant 
injury was missed. Deterioration during the CT scan occurred for 
a number of reasons. For example, a patient was sent for a CT scan 
inappropriately; his condition had not stabilised, and he should have 
been expedited to the operating theatre. Another patient had an 
undiagnosed tension pneumothorax, and 2 had dislodged endotracheal 
tubes. Two patients had non-salvageable head injuries and deteriorated 
during transfer back from the CT scanner. All 6 of these patients 
required an intervention while in the CT scan room to address their 
deterioration. Misinterpretation of CT scan images resulted in missed 
or delayed diagnosis of a variety of injuries, some of which were 
potentially serious and included missed vascular injuries (n=7), missed 
intra-abdominal injuries (n=6) and missed spinal injuries (n=9). In 
2 cases, reports were captured under the wrong patient name and this 
created clinical confusion. Table 5 summarises the types of errors.
Domain
The setting for the error was the ward (n=19), the radiology suite 
(n=126), the emergency department (n=45) and the operating 
theatre (n=2). The staff responsible for the adverse event were 
medical (n=155), nursing (n=4) and radiology staff (n=15). Table 6 
summarises the domains where the adverse events occurred.
Cause
There were 67 errors of commission and 125 errors of omission. 
The primary cause was a planning problem in 78 cases and an 
execution problem in 114. There was no evidence of intentional 
error, recklessness or willful negligence in this cohort. There were 
28 systems-related errors, and the rest were human errors. Table 7 
summarises the causes of the errors.
Table 2. Demographics of the patient cohort (N=192)
Sex, n (%)
Male 134 (69.8)
Female 58 (30.2)
Age (years), median 37
Race, n (%)
Black 165 (85.9)
Coloured 6 (3.1)
White 10 (5.2)
Asian 11 (5.7)
Table 3. Impact of the adverse events, according to Chang’s 
taxonomy[3] (N=192)
n (%)
Physical degree of harm
I 6 (3.1)
II 62 (32.3)
III 45 (23.4)
IV 11 (5.7)
V 27 (14.1)
VI 21 (10.9)
VII 15 (7.8)
VIII 3 (1.6)
IX 2 (1.0)
Psychological degree of harm
I 57 (29.7)
II 74 (38.5)
III 40 (20.8)
IV 7 (3.6)
V 9 (4.7)
VI 5 (2.6)
Legal implications 31 (16.1)
Social implications 136 (70.8)
Economic implications 137 (71.3)
Table 4. Clavien-Dindo grades[8] (N=192)
n (%)
I 64 (33.3)
II 77 (40.1)
IIIa 14 (7.3)
IIIb 33 (17.2)
IVa 2 (1.0)
V 2 (1.0)
Table 5. Types of adverse events (N=192)
n (%)
Performing an unnecessary scan 24 (12.5)
Omitting an indicated scan 23 (11.0)
Performing the scan incorrectly 8 (4.2)
Scanning the wrong body part 7 (3.6)
Equipment failure 18 (9.4)
Omitting treatment following the scan 6 (3.1)
Incorrect interpretation of scan 65 (33.9)
Deterioration in the scan room 6 (3.1)
Other 35 (18.2)
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Discussion
Advanced imaging is one of the cornerstones of modern trauma care, 
and CT scans allow for accurate and reliable imaging of the entire 
patient, which has facilitated modern non-operative approaches to 
trauma care. However, the process of obtaining imaging, similar to 
any other process of care, is susceptible to error and adverse events. 
The contemporary interest in understanding and quantifying adverse 
events and human error is derived from the realisation that error 
and adverse events have a significant impact on morbidity and 
even mortality and are costly to both the individual patient and the 
healthcare system as a whole.[1,7] The aviation and nuclear power 
industries have developed highly successful interventions to improve 
safety and reduce both the incidence and the impact of adverse events. 
The challenge is to apply these lessons to modern healthcare. Modern 
healthcare is also a complex dynamic system involving multiple role 
players who need to work as a team to deliver care, and it makes logical 
sense that the lessons from aviation can be applied to healthcare.[1,7]
The CT scan is a dangerous environment for a trauma patient, 
as it is usually remote from the resuscitation area and the patient 
is relatively unmonitored during the procedure. All efforts must 
be made to ensure that the patient is in a physiological condition 
to withstand transfer to the CT scan. Sending a patient who is 
acidotic and not responding to resuscitation is an example of 
cognitive lock-out and represents protocol violation. This is an active 
error, or error of commission. Similarly, not excluding a potential 
tension pneumothorax is an error of assessment. The incidence 
of deterioration during the CT scan in our series (6/1 566) was 
0.4%. This is a serious error, and efforts must be directed towards 
preventing it. The adage of the CT scanner being the ‘donut of death’ 
has its basis in this error.[1,7]
A common cause of error is poor communication, both between 
members of the trauma team and between members of the medical 
team and radiology. Poor communication resulted in omitting an 
indicated scan, performing the scan incorrectly, and scanning the 
wrong body part. These errors have a cumulative effect on the 
patient, as they delay diagnosis and/or exclusion of an injury and 
necessitate repeat scans.
The commonest errors related to CT scanning are errors of 
interpretation of the images.[9-11] This can have serious consequences 
for patients. We had 65 erroneous reports out of a total of 1 566, 
which gives an error rate of 4%. False-positive results can result 
in unnecessary operations, and false-negative scans can delay 
intervention. The commonest areas of misinterpretation include the 
spine, the vasculature and intra-abdominal pathology. The incorrect 
interpretation of CT images is a multifactorial problem that can 
best be understood as the result of dissonance directly impairing 
cognitive capacity and function. An error rate of 4% is well within 
the range of internationally reported rates. Several strategies need 
to be implemented to reduce this rate and to limit the impact 
of these reporting errors.[12,13] Most of these approaches revolve 
around the use of practices where each scan is reviewed by both 
the on-duty radiologist and the requesting surgeon. Understanding 
the mechanism of injury is essential to interpret CT findings, 
and without clinical insight, radiologists may fail to appreciate 
the significance of certain findings.[9,10] Newer approaches include 
structured reporting, voice-recognition dictation and computer-
aided detection and assessment of images.
The incidence of so-called contrast-induced nephropathy following 
a contrast-enhanced CT scan is controversial. Some experts do 
not consider that it is a distinct entity, while others see it as a real 
phenomenon. In our cohort of patients who underwent a contrast-
enhanced CT scan, there was a significant incidence of deterioration 
in renal function. In our environment all patients undergo aggressive 
fluid resuscitation, and a good urine output is established before 
sending patients for a CT scan.[14]
The response to these errors needs to be multifactorial, and this 
research should inform potential changes in practice. The major 
move in surgical safety has been adoption of the so-called surgical 
checklist prior to operation.[15] This approach has been shown to 
reduce postoperative morbidity and mortality. Extending it to a pre-
CT scan checklist for trauma patients may help to reduce these errors. 
It would force staff to reassess patients in a structured manner before 
sending them for a CT scan. The important issues to check are the 
response to resuscitation and the indication for the CT scan. Patients 
who are transient responders or have an indication for surgery must 
be clearly identified and not sent for a CT scan. The checklist would 
identify patients at risk of acute kidney injury and would help to 
reduce errors of communication and ensure that the correct scan is 
performed on the correct patient. In addition, a direct and accurate 
hand-over between requesting staff and radiology staff will ensure 
that the mechanism is correctly understood by the reporting staff, 
which may help them to identify injuries.
Study limitations
There are a number of limitations to this study. Its retrospective 
nature made detailed root-cause analysis of specific errors difficult, 
as the original protagonists were no longer readily accessible to report 
on the exact sequence of events.
Conclusions
Errors and adverse events related to obtaining a CT scan following 
blunt polytrauma are not uncommon and may impact significantly 
Table 7. Classification of the causes of adverse events (N=192)
n (%)
Human error 164 (85.4)
System error 28 (14.6)
Negligence error 0
Recklessness error 0
Intentional rule violations error 0
Cause 
Primary cause
Error in planning 78 (40.6)
Error in execution 114 (59.4)
Secondary cause
Error of commission 67 (34.9)
Error of omission 125 (65.1)
Table 6. Domain (N=192)
n (%)
Setting in which the event occurred
Radiology suite 126 (65.6)
Emergency department 45 (23.4)
Ward 19 (9.9)
Operating theatre 2 (1.0)
Staff involved
Doctor 155 (80.7)
Nursing staff 4 (2.1)
Radiology staff 15 (7.8)
System 18 (9.4)
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on the patient. They include physiological deterioration during the 
CT scan, breakdowns in communication resulting in inappropriate 
scans being performed, misinterpretation of the CT scan images, 
and contrast-induced nephropathy. Efforts must be directed towards 
preventing these errors and limiting their impact on patients.
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